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ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SURVEY
VI. DEDUCTIONS
A. Expenses and Indebtedness Under § 2053(a)
(1) Trustee's Fee As Administration Expenses Under
§ 2053(a)(2).
Section 2053(a)(2)' permits a deduction in computing the taxable
estate2 for expenses incurred in administering an estate. These expen-
ses include executor's commissions, 3 attorney's fees,4 and miscella-
neous expenditures.5 The primary test for deductibility under § 2053
is whether these expenses are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction
under which the estate is administered. The applicable regulation
imposes the additional requirement that deductible administrative
expenses must be incurred in settling the estate rather than on behalf
of a legatee who receives the assets after the estate is settled.' One
problem encountered under this section is presented by inter vivos
trusts which terminate and are included in the gross estate at dece-
dent's death. The courts have held that if the applicable local law
permits payment of a trustee's commissions, a deduction may be
taken in computing the net estate. 7 A second problem is presented by
testamentary trusts to which assets are transferred after the dece-
dent's death. No deduction is permitted since the trustees are ac-
tually legatees and any expenditures are incurred for their benefit
rather than on behalf of the administration of the estate.' In 1974,
trustee's commissions in the context of both types of trusts were the
subject of litigation?
In Estate of Marie A. DeFoucaucourt,10 the Tax Court permitted
a deduction for executors' commissions and for trustees' fees although
' INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a)(2).
2 The taxable estate is defined in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2051.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(b) (1958).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(c) (1958).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d) (1958). These miscellaneous expenditures include
trustee's commissions for administering an inter vivos trust included in the gross estate
for tax purposes. See Estate of Marie A. DeFoucaucourt, 62 T.C. 485 (1974); Haggart's
Estate v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1950). However, the trustee's commis-
sions may only be deducted for the period between decedent's death and the distribu-
tion of the trust assets to the estate. See Mary E. Burrow Trust, 39 T.C. 1080 (1963),
aff'd, 333 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1964); Elroy N. Clark, 1 T.C. 663 (1943).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) (1958).
Estate of Marie A. DeFoucaucort, 62 T.C. 485 (1974).
Streeter v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1974).
In addition to the decisions discussed in the text, see with regard to § 2053(a)(2),
Rev. Rul. 74-509, 1974 INr. REv. BULL. No. 42, at 38 which is discussed at note 18 infra.
10 62 T.C. 485 (1974).
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the same persons acted in both capacities. The decedent had created
an inter vivos trust with income payable to her in quarterly install-
ments. According to the trust instrument, the trust was to terminate
at decedent's death and ninety-nine per cent of the trust assets were
to be transferred to the executors. When decedent died the executors
of the estate were also the trustees of the inter vivos trust. After
termination and transfer, the trust assets comprised ninety-five per
cent of the estate. The Tax Court determined that the right to trus-
tees' commissions arose immediately after the trust terminated and
the assets were transferred to the beneficiary estate, as provided in
the trust instrument. Thus, at decedent's death and after transfer of
the assets to the executors, the trustees were entitled to commissions.
In addition, the DeFoucaucourt court held that since New York per-
mits double commissions even if the same persons act as trustees and
as executors, the estate could not be denied a deduction because the
trustees would also receive executors' fees. Therefore, the court per-
mitted the double payment to be deducted although it refused to
decide whether the trustees' commissions were deductions from the
gross estate or exclusions from the trust assets before they were in-
cluded in the estate."
In permitting the double payments to be deducted, the
DeFoucaucourt court rejected three contentions vigorously advanced
by the Government. The Commissioner first argued that because the
estate was comprised primarily of trust assets, and since the same
persons had functioned in both capacities, a deduction for the double
commissions should be disallowed. The Tax Court rejected this argu-
ment on the basis that New York law, which controlled the decision,
permitted both commissions and fees to persons acting in a dual
capacity. 12 Therefore the test in § 2053(a)(2) had been met because
the deduction was allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction in which
the estate was administered.
The second contention advanced by the Government involved the
proper time at which the trust terminated. The Commissioner argued
that the trust property actually passed through the estate to the will
beneficiaries. Thus the trust did not terminate until distribution of
" See, e.g., In re Estate of Joslyn, 500 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1974); Streeter v. Com-
missioner, 491 F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1974); Haggart's Estate v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 514
(3d Cir. 1950).
" The courts have consistently examined the law of the jurisdiction in which the
estate is administered to ascertain if the contested fee or commission is allowable, and
if the amount is reasonable. See, e.g., Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651 (5th Cir.
1967); Ballance v. United States, 347 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1965); Commissioner v. Bron-
son, 32 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1929); Estate of Christine Swayne, 43 T.C. 190 (1964)
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the estate to the beneficiaries named in the will. The Government
argued, therefore, that the trustees were not entitled to commissions
when the trust assets were transferred to the executors of the estate.
The court in DeFoucaucourt rejected this argument because the pro-
visions for distribution under the trust and under the will were differ-
ent. The trust instrument required distribution to the estate execu-
tors whereas the will named other specific beneficiaries. Further, the
court noted that the trust and the will were governed by separate
instruments, each of which imposed different duties on the trustee-
executors.
Finally, the Government unsuccessfully argued that the decedent
could have provided for distribution of the trust assets directly to
specific beneficiaries rather than to the estate executors. If the trust
instrument had named the specific beneficiaries, the trust assets
would not have been included in the gross estate. This alternate
method of distribution would have reduced the gross estate and con-
sequently reduced the executor's fees. The court rejected this argu-
ment reasoning that the decedent had no duty to reduce deductions
from the gross estate. The court noted that the Government had
failed to cite any authority to support its position. In sum, the court
determined that the trust was valid and was separate from the estate,
and that termination entitled the trustees to deductible commissions
as provided by New York law.
The DeFoucaucourt decision appears consistent with prior case
law involving deductions for expenses related to inter vivos trusts
subsequently included in the gross estate. For example, in Haggart's
Estate v. Commissioner13 deductions were allowed for attorney's fees,
court costs, and trustee's commissions incurred in settling an inter
vivos trust after the settlor's death. These expenses were necessitated
by a trust accounting, required under Pennsylvania law, before the
trust "assets were included in the gross estate. The Third Circuit in
Haggart reasoned that because the trust assets were to be included
in the gross estate for tax purposes, the expenses involved in settling
the trust preparatory to inclusion must be deducted." In addition,
the Haggart court noted that deductions for these expenses were al-
lowable under Pennsylvania law. Thus, the DeFoucaucourt court's
emphasis on New York law as determinative of the time for terminat-
ing the trust and for paying trustees' commissions seems proper
under prior precedent.
Ns 182 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1950).
11 Id. at 515-16. Accord, Mary E. Burrow Trust, 39 T.C. 1080, 1088 (1963); Emma
Peabody Abbett, 17 T.C. 1293 (1952); Elroy N. Clark, 1 T.C. 663, 668 (1943).
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In Streeter v. Commissioner,'5 the Third Circuit refused a deduc-
tion for auctioneer's commissions incurred for the sale of assets in a
testamentary trust. The major asset in decedent's estate, a collection
of American historical memorabilia, was bequeathed to testamentary
trustees who also acted as executors of the estate. The will provisions
governing the testamentary trust authorized the trustees to sell this
collection at public or private sale within a period of twenty-one years
from the date of decedent's death.'6 The sales proceeds were to be
distributed to certain institutions and to the decedent's children.
Although the net proceeds of the sales were reported by the trustees,
the executors deducted the auctioneer's commissions incurred for the
sales as expenses of the estate." In disallowing a deduction from the
gross estate under § 2053(a)(2), the court held that the auctioneer's
commissions were actually expenses paid for the benefit of legatees
rather than for the administration of the estate. 8 Finding that the
estate had been settled upon distribution of the assets to the testa-
15 491 F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 377.
17 Id.
1" Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) (1958). In addition to distinguishing between deduct-
ible administrative expenses and those expended on behalf of a legatee, the regulation
stipulates that expenditures must be "actually and necessarily incurred." Although
the Streeter court did not discuss this requirement, it has been challenged and held
invalid as applied to selling expenses. Estate of Park v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 673
(6th Cir. 1973). See also Estate of David Smith, 57 T.C. 650, 662 (1972) (Goffe, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Note, Estate Tax - Administrative Expense
Deductions - A Reaffirmation of the Section 2053(a) Standard, 52 N.C.L. REv. 190
(1973).
Despite the challenge in Park to the regulation requirement that expenses be
actually and necessarily incurred to effect distribution of the estate, Rev. Rul. 74-509,
1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 42, at 38, has reiterated the standard. The question presented
in the revenue ruling was whether attorneys' fees arising from litigation involving an
ambiguous will provision could be deducted as estate expenses. In the will, the dece-
dent set up separate trusts for each of his two children, with a contingent remainder
to his grandchildren. Because the will provisions governing the size of the trusts were
ambiguous, court proceedings were instituted by the estate executor to seek clarifica-
tion. The primary beneficiaries were actively represented by counsel, and the contin-
gent beneficiaries were assigned guardians ad litem who were also represented by
counsel. Revenue Ruling 74-509 stated that, to determine the allowability of a deduc-
tion, three requirements must be met: the fees must be reasonable; the fees must be
allowable as an administration expense under local law; and, the fees must be actually
incurred in settling or distributing the estate. Treasury regulations § § 20.2053-3(a) and
20.2053-3(c)(3) contain the requirement that the fees be actually and necessarily in-
curred in settling the estate. The revenue ruling concluded that the attorneys' fees paid
by the primary and contingent beneficiaries of the trusts were properly deducted as
administration expenses because construction of the will provision was essential in
determining the amount to be transferred from the estate to the trusts.
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mentary trustees, the court held that a deduction would violate §
2053(a)(2) and the applicable regulation.
In reaching this conclusion, the Streeter court rejected two con-
tentions advanced by the estate. The estate executors first- argued
that the sale of the collection by the trustees should be analyzed as
the "functional equivalent"'" of a sale by the executors. However, the
court refused to treat the sales as if they had been made by the
executors, first noting that the regulations for § 2053(a)(2) draw a
careful distinction between expenses incurred in administering an
estate, and those expenses for the benefit of legatees." The latter were
not allowable deductions from the gross estate. The court further
stated that the decedent had created a valid testamentary trust. Not
only were the duties as executors and as trustees distinct, but the
trustees had been given twenty-one years in which to sell the trust
assets. Usually the administration of an estate may not be prolonged
over such an extended period. Finally, the court in Streeter deter-
mined that under New Jersey law the trust would be recognized as
valid, and the auctioneer's commissions would be considered trust
expenses. Therefore, the statutory test in § 2053(a) (2), requiring that
deductions from the gross estate must be allowable under the laws of
the jurisdiction in which the estate is administered, had not been met
because New Jersey law recognized these commissions as trust expen-
ses. Also, since the testamentary trustees were legatees, the regula-
tion test requiring that deductions must be incurred in administering
the estate,21 had not been met. For these reasons the court rejected
the taxpayer's argument that the sale by the trustees should be ana-
lyzed as the functional equivalent of a sale by the executors.
The Streeter court also rejected the executor's second argument
which was essentially a variation of the first contention. The execu-
tors again advocated a functional approach but relied on § 2053(b)
2
rather than on § 2053(a)(2). Section 2053(b) permits a deduction for
expenses of administration of property which is not subject to claims.
Property not subject to claims is that which is excluded from the
probate estate such as an inter vivos trust,2 but which is included in
the gross estate for estate tax purposes. For example, if the trustee
11 491 F.2d at 379-80, citing Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(b)(3) (1958).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) (1958).
21 See note 18 supra.
22 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(b).
" See Mary E. Burrow Trust, 39 T.C. 1080, 1087 (1963); 2 J. BEVERIDGE, THE LAW
OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION § 13.16, at 176-78 (1956); Report of Committee on Death
Taxation of Estates and Trusts, Part I: Estate Tax Deductions for Expenses, 9 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 267 (1974).
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of non-probate assets also performs duties similar to those of an exec-
utor, the trustee's commissions are an allowable deduction from the
gross estate.24
However, the Streeter court refused to accept a functional analy-
sis. The court held that although § 2053(b) permitted deductions
where a trustee of non-probate assets functioned in the capacity of
an executor, the section was inapplicable because the property here
was part of a testamentary trust rather than part of the estate.2 In
addition, the estate assets had never qualified as § 2053(b) property
because they had passed through the probate estate and were subject
to claims. The estate assets had been § 2053(a) (2) property but were
now part of a testamentary trust. Consequently, the court in Streeter
held that the auctioneer's commissions could not be deducted as
administrative expenses because they were expenditures incurred on
behalf of a legatee rather than on behalf of the administration of
either probate or non-probate estate assets.
Therefore, it seems that the courts will carefully analyze the char-
acter of the assets for which administrative expenses are sought to be
deducted. If the assets were part of an inter vivos trust which is
subsequently included in the gross estate for tax purposes, a deduc-
tion is permitted for administrative expenses related to winding up
the trust preparatory to inclusion. State law governs in determining
the actions necessary for terminating the trust. Conversely, if the
estate assets are distributed to a testamentary trust, expenditures on
behalf of that trust are not deductible. The expenses are not incurred
in settling the estate but are made on behalf of a legatee.
(2) Marital, Support, or Inheritance Rights as "Claims"
Under § 2053(a)(3).
Section 2053(a)(3)26 of the Internal Revenue Code permits a de-
duction, in determining the taxable estate,27 for claims which are
allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the estate is being
administered. Section 2053 (c) (1) (A) 2 limits the deduction for claims.
If the claim is founded upon a promise or agreement, the amount
must have been contracted bona fide and for a full, adequate consid-
eration in money or money's worth." This "statutory consideration"
2, Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-8 (1958).
2 491 F.2d at 379.
"' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a)(3). See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958).
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2051.
28 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(c)(1)(A).
29 As one commentator has explained "[t]he consideration requirement is in-
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requirement insures that the estate assets will not be depleted under
the guise of a claim in order to avoid tax liability. Finally, § 2053(e)3"
in conjunction with § 2043(b)3 ' stipulates that "a relinquishment or
promised relinquishment of dower or curtesy, or of other marital
rights in the decedent's property or estate,"32 does not constitute the
requisite statutory consideration.
These provisions of the Code have been a source of difficulty when -
applied to claims based on prenuptial,3 separation,3 4 or divorce ar-
rangements. 5 A prenuptial arrangement is recognizably founded
upon a promise or agreement and therefore must comply with the
statutory consideration requirement. However, postmarital situa-
tions are more ambiguous because rights in addition to marital
inheritance rights have been released. Two methods of circumventing
the limitations in §§ 2053(c)(1)(A) and 2053(e) have developed in
post-marital situations."
First, if a spouse relinquishes support rights rather than inheri-
tance rights in the property or estate of the decedent, the claim has
been deemed deductible to the extent of the commuted value of the
right to support.3 1 Support rights have been construed to be distin-
tended to prevent an estate from obtaining a deduction for what is actually a testamen-
tary disposition of the decedent." Report of Committee on Death Taxation of Estates
and Trusts, Part II: Estate Tax Deductions for Claims, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST
J. 492, 501 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Committee]. SeL also Lowndes, Consideration
and the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes: Transfers for Partial Consideration, Relin-
quishment of Marital Rights, Family Annuities, the Widow's Election, and Reciprocal
Trusts, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 50 (1966).
30 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(e) refers to § 2043(b) for the rule governing
consideration and marital rights.
3' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2043(b).
32 Id. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1(b) (1958).
3 See, e.g., Sutton v. Commissioner, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,009 at 85,787 (4th
Cir. 1974), aff'g, 32 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 982 (1973); Estate of Michael Ellman, 59 T.C.
367 (1972); Estate of Isadore Rubin, 57 T.C. 817 (1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir.
1973); Estate of Francis R. Pollard, 52 T.C. 741 (1969).
1' See Sherman v. United States, 492 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1974).
31 See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,019 at 85,819 (C.D.
Cal. 1974); Estate of Saxton W. Barrett, 56 T.C. 1312 (1971); Estate of Morrison T.
O'Nan, 47 T.C. 648 (1967); Estate of Robert Rodger Glen, 45 T.C. 323 (1966).
3' See Graves, Federal Taxation in Separation and Divorce, 29 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1 (1972); Comment, Federal Tax Aspects of Divorce and Separation, 44 Miss. L.J.
740 (1973); Note, Federal Estate Tax Treatment of Property Settlements in Divorce,
43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1194 (1968).
11 In Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946), the court held that
"other marital rights" in INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 812(b), the predecessor to § 2043(b)
of the present Code, included a spouse's right to support. Nevertheless, the deduction
was permitted because it was based upon the court's divorce decree rather than upon
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guishable from "other marital rights" in § 2043(b). Therefore,
relinquishment constitutes the necessary statutory consideration. 8
Second, if the property settlement concluded pursuant to separation
or divorce is incorporated into a court decree, the claim has been held
not to be founded upon a promise or agreement.3 9 Although inheri-
tance rights are relinquished, the statutory consideration require-
ment does not have to be satisfied. Under the decree exception, how-
ever, the court granting the decree must have the power to alter the
parties' agreement. 0
In Sutton v. Commissioner;" the Fourth Circuit affirmed, per
a promise or agreement. See note 39 infra. E.T. 19, 1946-2 CuM. BULL. 166 partially
reversed the decision in Maresi by holding:
It is the view of the Bureau that the surrender of support rights is not
one of the "other marital rights" referred to in [§ 812(b)] . . . to the
extent that a transfer does not exceed the reasonable value of the
support rights of the wife it is to be treated as made for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth.
E.T. 19, 1946-2 CUM. BULL. 166, 168-69. However, a relinquishment of property or of
inheritance rights was still deemed not to fulfill the requisite statutory consideration.
Id. at 169.
31 See, e.g., Estate of Robert Rodger Glen, 45 T.C. 323, 339-40 (1966).
11 See Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950); Commissioner v. Estate of
Myles C. Watson, 216 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1954); Estate of Chester H. Bowers, 23 T.C.
911 (1955). The decree exception arose because in a property settlement agreement,
as opposed to a support arrangement, one spouse did relinquish inheritance rights
which had been held not to constitute consideration. To avoid the need for statutory
consideration, then, the phrase in § 2043(c)(1)(A) "when founded on a promise or
agreement" was attacked through the development of the decree exception. E.T. 19,
1946-2 CuM. BULL. 166 was modified to recognize the decree exception by Rev. Rul.
160, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 374. The 1946 ruling was finally superseded in Rev. Rul. 379,
1968-2 CuM. BULL. 414.
In Estate of Robert Rodger Glen, 45 T.C. 323 (1966), the court reasoned that §
2043(b) applied only to situations where the spouse attempted to relinquish rights
accruing to a surviving spouse. Consequently, the arm's length bargaining involved in
a property settlement and divorce situation, even though inheritance rights were relin-
quished, did not involve the kind of marital complicity contemplated by § 2043(b).
One commentator explains that the theory for distinguishing support rights and
marital rights
[i]s that payments for support are lifetime obligations of the dece-
dent imposed by statute . . . . [which] furnishes the required con-
sideration. Payments in extinguishment of such [legal] obligation
reduce the assets of the decedent during lifetime. Marital rights, how-
ever, do not arise until after death and are in the nature of a bequest.
Committee, supra note 29, at 503.
40 See, e.g., Estate of Saxton W. Barrett, 56 T.C. 1312 (1971); cases cited note 39
supra.
41 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,009 at 85,787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021
(1974).
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curiam, a decision by the Tax Court 42 which held that a prenuptial
agreement did not create a deductible claim against the estate under
§ 2053(a)(3) . 3 By the terms of the prenuptial agreement, the parties
relinquished all rights in each other's property whether previously
owned or acquired after marriage. In addition, each waived any statu-
tory estate which might arise because of marriage. Each party
granted a lifetime annuity to the other in return for these provisions.44
The Tax Court rejected the deduction for the commuted value of
the wife's monthly annuity and held that, since the claim was
founded on an agreement, the requisite statutory consideration had
not been supplied. The taxpayer unsuccessfully contended that since
the annuities represented equivalent proportions of each spouse's as-
sets, the consideration requirement had been fulfilled.45 Rejecting
this argument the Tax Court stated that the consideration must be
subject to pecuniary valuation and must be commensurate with the
benefit flowing from the estate."
The decision in Sutton appears consistent with prior case law.,'
Sections 2043(b) and 2053(c)(1)(A), by requiring an equal monetary
benefit to flow into the estate, insure that estate assets are not de-
pleted in an effort to avoid tax liability. Since the parties are non-
adversary in a prenuptial situation, evasion of estate tax may be one
purpose for their agreement. Normally, a surviving spouse would not
receive a distributive share in the estate until after payment of taxes.
If this distributive or inheritance share is converted into a claim
42 32 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 982 (1973).
4' The estate also attempted to claim the commuted value of the widow's right to
$400 a month for life as a marital deduction under § 2056. However, this deduction
was disallowed because the residue of the estate, from which the annuity was to be
paid, would revert to the son and consequently violated the terminable interest rule
of § 2056(b). 32 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 982, 984 (1973).
' Id. at 983.
4' At the time of the agreement, the husband had assets worth $296,946.75, and
had promised his wife a monthly stipend of $400 whether or not she remarried. In
return, the wife, whose assets were $46,450.00 had promised the husband a monthly
allotment of $50.00. Id. at 983.
" Id. at 984. In Latty v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1933), the require-
ment of consideration in money or money's worth was construed "to permit the deduc-
tion of claims only to the extent that such claims were contracted for a consideration
which at the time either augmented the estate of the decedent, granted to him some
right or privilege he did not possess before, or operated to discharge a then existing
claim . . . ." Id. at 954. See Estate of Ella J. Davis, 57 T.C. 833 (1972); Estate of
Herbert C. Tiffany, 47 T.C. 491 (1967).
' See, e.g., Estate of Michael Ellman, 59T.C. 367 (1972); Estate of Isadore Rubin,
57 T.C. 817 (1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973); Estate of FrancisR. Pollard,
52 T.C. 741 (1969).
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based solely on contractually sufficient consideration,48 a deduction
will result before the tax is paid. Section 2043(b), which prevents a
relinquishment of marital inheritance rights from constituting con-
sideration in money or money's worth, and § 2053(c)(1)(A), which
limits deductions for claims to the extent that they are contracted for
adequate consideration in money or money's worth, apply to the pre-
cise situation in Sutton. Were the claim allowed, the wife's monthly
annuity would deplete the husband's estate without returning any-
thing of comparable monetary value." Conversely, if disallowed, the
wife's annuity representing her inheritance share would have re-
mained as part of the estate subject only to the marital deduction
provisions.-" Thus, Sutton merely reiterates a previously recognized
limitation. A relinquishment of marital rights is insufficient consider-
ation for a claim founded upon a prenuptial agreement.
A more unusual result occurred in Sherman v. United States.5 In
Sherman, the Fifth Circuit permitted a deduction for support pay-
ments although the spouses had never been either legally separated
or divorced. The postmarital support agreement provided that the
wife was to receive a monthly stipend of $1500 for life or until remar-
riage, and that the sums paid through an inter vivos trust were to be
credited against the total amount.52 Applying an actuarial computa-
tion of the wife's life expectancy and possibility of remarriage, the
commuted value of the support rights was $129,040.0 Since the trust
assets were $83,953, the estate could be subjected to a $45,087 claim."'
In the trial court, however, the Government had argued successfully
that because there was a thirty per cent probability that the wife
would not live to consume the trust assets, the claim against the
11 See Lowndes, Consideration and the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes: Transfers
for Partial Consideration, Relinquishment of Marital Rights, Family Annuities, the
Widow's Election, and Reciprocal Trusts, 35 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 50, 52-60 (1966).
"' See, e.g., Estate of Francis R. Pollard, 52 T.C. 741, 744 (1969).
" See 2 R. RICE, FAMILY TAX PLANNING Ch. 20 §§ 4-29, at 863-82 (1974).
5 492 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1974). In the initial proceeding, 334 F. Supp. 1311 (N.D.
Ga. 1971), the court held that since Georgia law gave the wife a right to support
payments without divorce proceedings which extended beyond the husband's death,
the claim was enforceable against the estate. The court found that the consideration
was adequate because, in return for the support arrangement, the wife relinquished
her right to sue for support. Id. at 1316. The Fifth Circuit accepted this decision but
remanded for a trial on the proper valuation of the support rights, 462 F.2d 577 (5th
Cir. 1972). The present appeal was from a decision that the support rights could not
be valued and were therefore not deductible.
52 492 F.2d 1045, 1046 (5th Cir. 1974).
53 Id.
54 Id.
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estate was negligible. The trial court accepted the "negligible stan-
dard" and disallowed the deduction because of the possibility that
the claim would not have to be paid." The Fifth Circuit resoundingly
rejected the argument. The court reprimanded counsel for failing to
point out that a possibility of non-payment as a basis for disallowing
a deduction was a limitation imposed on charitable deductions, not
on claims." Finding that the actuarial valuation was valid, the
Sherman court permitted a deduction for the difference between the
trust assets and the total amount of support payments.
Perhaps, rather than an attempted analogy between support
claims and the charitable deduction, a better argument might have
been predicated on valuations of support rights under federal law. In
Sherman, Georgia law gave the wife an enforceable right to support
payments which continued after the husband's death. Thus, the
court analyzed the primary issue as the proper method by which to
value the future right to support payments. However, the Govern-
ment could have contended that the issue was how long this future
right lasted based on federal law which, in several situations dealing
with support rights and with divorce decrees, has been held to govern
both the deductibility and the valuation of a claim.
Specifically, in Estate of Isadore Rubin,57 a prenuptial agreement
case, the Tax Court defined support rights as those payments to
which a spouse was entitled only during marriage. The Rubin court
also noted that even if a claim were enforceable under the laws of the
jurisdiction in which the estate was administered, the initial test in
§ 2053(a)(3), the deductibility of the claim was a matter of federal
law. In addition, two revenue rulings" have suggested that where the
11 Id. at 1047.
"The negligible standard, which the Government attempted to apply to the claim
for support payments, is provided in Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(b) (1958). The Govern-
ment cited Commissioner v. Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 (1955), and United States v.
Dean, 224 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1955), in support of the argument. Both cases involved
charitable deductions and held that if, at the date of testator's death, the possibility
that the charity will benefit after a life tenant is negligible, there can be no charitable
deduction.
'T 57 T.C. 817 (1972).
Id. at 823.
' In Rev. Rul. 67, 1971-1 Cum. BuLL. 271, it was stated that, where a spouse had
support rights under state law, a separation agreement created an indebtedness of the
estate which was deductible to the extent of the postponed amount of the payments
which the wife would have received during the married life of the parties. The ruling
was addressed to a situation where the parties entered into a support agreement but
obtained neither a legal separation nor a divorce. See Rev. Rul. 160, 1960-1 CuM. BULL.
374.
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decree exception does not apply, support rights are not completely
deductible. The decree exception, which obviates the requirement of
statutory consideration, did not apply to Sherman since the parties
were neither legally separated nor divorced. Finally, although the
relinquishment of support rights does constitute consideration, §
2053(c)(1) (A) limits the deduction to the amount for which adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth was received."
The Government might have argued that rather than a full deduc-
tion for the present value of all future support rights conferred by
Georgia law, a different valuation was possible. In Revenue Ruling
60-1601 it was stated that if the divorce court lacked the power to
alter the parties' property settlement "a deduction is allowable only
to the extent that the transfer does not exceed the reasonable value
of the support rights."6 Revenue Ruling 71-6713 stated that in a sepa-
ration which was not followed by court proceedings, seemingly the
Sherman situation, a deduction could be taken only for the amount
of the support payments which were attributable to the joint lives of
the parties." Revenue Ruling 71-67 also noted that a decision on the
amount of the deduction was to be made by a District Director con-
sidering factors such as the husband's income, the extent of the hus-
band's assets, and the ages of the parties.
Therefore, the Government might have contended that although
Georgia conferred a right to support payments beyond the husband's
death, under Estate of Isadore Rubin support rights in a federal law
context were available only during marriage. Next, the contention
might have been made that the valuation of support rights during the
joint lives of the parties was to be reasonable. Finally, a valuation of
support rights should be based on the factors listed in Revenue Ruling
71-67 because the goal was to insure that the support rights were
valued and deducted only to the extent that they represented ade-
quate and full consideration.
A countervailing factor in Sherman, not present in prenuptial
arrangements like the one in Rubin, was that negotiations were un-
dertaken at arm's length through counsel.65 Hostility between the
parties has been recognized, where a property settlement agreement
was in anticipation of a subsequently obtained divorce, as evidence
" See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
" Rev. Rul. 160, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 374.
62 Id. at 376.
63 Rev. Rul. 67, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 271.
' Id. at 272.
" Sherman v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 1311, 1313 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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of full statutory consideration for the arrangements."6 The require-
ments of Revenue Ruling 71-67 seem to be, therefore, unnecessary.
The adversity of the parties insures that the agreement is not de-
signed to avoid the estate tax, and § 2043(b) should therefore be
inapplicable. Since the statutory consideration requirement is ful-
filled by a relinquishment of support rights, the adversity of the par-
ties to a separation agreement should insure that each party has
received full value whether or not the rights extend beyond the joint
lives of the spouses. Thus, because the Sherman court did not ques-
tion the value of the support rights, one could argue that the court
recognized that adversity assures full value. Unfortunately, however,
it seems that the court disregarded the valuation issue because the
Government chose to contest the lower court decision on other
grounds. But the result in Sherman remains unique regardless of the
court's justification, for it permitted the parties to determine the
value of a support arrangement without any external standard, such
as the factors listed in Revenue Ruling 71-67.
The divorce decree exception was also the subject of litigation in
1974. In Gray v. United States,"7 the court for the Central District of
California held that an obligation, created by a property settlement
agreement which was incorporated into a divorce decree, to maintain
life insurance policies was a deductible claim of the estate. Under the
property settlement agreement, the husband was obligated to make
two lump sum payments, to pay monthly alimony, and to maintain
life insurance policies in the aggregate face amount of $50,000.8 The
court found that, pursuant to the divorce decree, decedent was re-
quired to pay the policy premiums. 9 In addition, the divorce decree,
under California law, was enforceable through execution. Although
the insurance proceeds had been paid directly to the wife, the court
held that the executor could have been forced to pay her. Conse-
quently, the insurance proceeds, included in the gross estate as an
interest owned by decedent at death, were deductible.
The Government, admitting the validity of the claim, attempted
to rely on § 20.2053-4 of the regulations70 and on Revenue Ruling 71-
482 7 to prevent the deduction. Section 20.2053-4 requires that a
" See Estate of Morrison T. O'Nan, 47 T.C. 648, 664 (1967); Estate of Robert
Rodger Glen, 45 T.C. 323, 333 (1966).
1, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,019 at 85,819 (C.D. Cal. 1974). Accord, Estate of Wil-
liam E. Robinson, 63 CCH TAX CT. REP. No. 68 (March 24, 1975).
74-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 13,019 at 85,819 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
, See notes 37 & 39 supra.
70 Tress. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958).
"1 Rev. Rul. 482, 1971-2 CUm. BuLL. 334.
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claim, to be deductible, must be a personal obligation of the decedent
existing at the time of death. Revenue Ruling 71-482 applies the
regulation to insurance policies. The ruling states that if a husband
is required to maintain life insurance policies pursuant to a divorce
decree, the obligation terminates at his death. Conversely, if the
husband purchases life insurance policies because he is obligated to
provide the wife with a fixed sum of money, the claim is deductible.
7 2
The court in Gray rejected the revenue ruling as an unrealistic and
strained reading of the regulation."
Having conceded, in Revenue Ruling 60-160,11 that a property
settlement arrangement incorporated into a divorce decree is not
founded upon a promise or agreement, the attempted distinction in
Revenue Ruling 71-482 seems unsound. Under the decree exception,
the requirement of statutory consideration need not be met since the
arrangement is not founded upon a promise or agreement. Therefore,
the obligations imposed by the divorce decree should constitute de-
ductible claims regardless of the form of payment. 75 The result in
Gray in which the obligation to maintain life insurance was held to
be the same as the duty to pay a sum of money, seems proper.
(3) Effects of "Subsequent Events" on Deductibility of Claims
Under § 2053(a)(3).
In addition to the general requirements of § 2053 that the claim
be allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the estate is
administered and that the consideration for the claim be ascertaina-
ble in money or money's worth, the applicable treasury regulation
imposes two additional limitations on § 2053(a)(3) . The claim must
be a personal obligation of the decedent existing at the time of death,
and must be enforceable against the decedent's estate. A major con-
troversy engendered by § 2053(a)(3) is the proper time at which to
determine the deductibility of a claim.7 While some courts have
72 Id.
73 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,019 at 85,821.
71 Rev. Rul. 160, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 374.
" In Estate of Chester H. Bowers, 23 T.C. 911 (1955), the Tax Court recognized
that the obligation to maintain life insurance created an indebtedness which was
deductible by the estate. The test prescribed by the court was whether, if the husband
had failed to maintain the life insurance, the wife could have forced the estate to pay
the amount which the life insurance was supposed to have paid. Id. at 920. The Gray
court found that the wife could have required payment of the insurance amount from
the estate.
16 Trees. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958).
11 The controversy regarding the use of subsequent events in determining the
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examined events subsequent to the date of death to determine if the
claim has been enforced, 8 others have held that subsequent events
may not be considered."
In Estate of Frank G. Hagmann,'8 the Fiftl Circuit affirmed, per
curiam, a decision by the Tax Court 8' that claims which had become
unenforceable after decedent's death were not deductible under §
2053(a)(3). The alleged claims in Hagmann were bona fide, personal
obligations of the decedent. However, the creditors had failed to seek
payment within the six-month statutory limitation imposed by Flor-
ida law.12 Consequently, the claims would never be paid by the estate
and the attempt to take a deduction was disallowed.
In holding that subsequent events were significant in determining
the deductibility of a claim, the Hagmann court rejected the tax-
payer's reliance on the Supreme Court case of Ithaca Trust Co. v.
United States. In Ithaca Trust, the decedent left a life interest to
his wife and the remainder to charity. The wife died six months later
and decedent's estate argued that this fact controlled the valuation
of the life interest. However, the Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment holding that an estate was settled as of the date of death,84 and
that a life interest must be valued according to actuarial tables.8 5 The
Hagmann court distinguished this case on the basis that the main
deductibility of claims under § 2053(a)(3) derives from differing interpretations of
Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929), a Supreme Court case in which
it was held that an estate was settled at the date of death, but which specifically
discussed charitable contributions. See text accompanying notes 83-86 infra. Compare
cases cited note 78 infra with cases cited note 79 infra. See also Comment, Effect of
Events Subsequent to the Decedent's Death on the Valuation of Claims Against His
Estate Under Section 2053 of the Federal Estate Tax, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 770 [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
11 See, e.g., Estate of Frank G. Hagmann, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974); Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960); Jacobs v. Commissioner, 34
F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929); Estate of Quintard Peters Courtney, 62 T.C. 317 (1974); John
Jacobs, 34 B.T.A. 594 (1936).
71 See, e.g., DuVal's Estate v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1945); Russell
v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Winer v. United States, 153 F.
Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Cathcart v. Schwaner, 15 Am. Fed. Tax R. 564 (S.D. Ill.
1935); Estate of Donald Elbert Lester, Sr., 57 T.C. 503 (1972).
- 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), aff'g, 60 T.C. 465 (1973). See Com-
ment, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 625 (1974); Note, 10 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 328 (1974).
" 60 T.C. 465, at 467-68.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.16 (1964), as amended FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.702 (Supp.
1974).
- 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
"I Id. at 155.
As Id.
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issue in Ithaca Trust was the proper method of valuation for charita-
ble contributions. The court thus determined that Ithaca Trust did
not impose the date of death as the time for the final decision on the
deductibility of claims." Instead, the Tax Court seemed to suggest
that all events up to the time of filing the estate tax return could
properly be considered in determining the deductibility of a claim."
To support this conclusion, the court in Hagmann considered the
underlying purpose of § 2053(a)(3), which was to insure that only the
net value of the estate was taxed. Thus, claims, even if valid, which
were unpaid or unenforceable did not affect the value of the property
passing to the succeeding generation, and should not be permitted to
be deducted.8
The other 1974 case dealing with the date at which to determine
the deductibility of a claim was Estate of Quintard Peters Courtney."
The Tax Court in Courtney examined subsequent events and refused
a deduction for a claimed mortgage indebtedness." In 1964, decedent
and his wife purchased a residence secured by a deed of trust and note
which they executed jointly as co-makers. One month later the two
gave the property to a son, subject to the note and deed of trust.
Decedent subsequently died in 1969 and his estate tax return, which
did not include the value of the property given to the son in his gross
86 60 T.C. 465 at 467-68. Those courts which have rejected the idea that Ithaca
Trust states a principle of finality applicable in all controversies over valuation have
done so for two reasons. First, unlike the charitable contribution in Ithaca Trust, the
statute includes claims with funeral and administration expenses. Thus, claims are
also to be determined during the orderly administration of the estate. See, e.g., Com-
missioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960). Second, an unenforced or
unenforceable claim is not a "claim" within the meaning of § 2053(a)(3) because it
does not affect the net value of the estate. See, e.g., Estate of Frank G. Hagmann, 492
F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974); Jacobs v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929); Estate
of Quintard Peters Courtney, 62 T.C. 317 (1974); Comment, supra note 77, at 782.
1 60 T.C. at 467-68. See also Commissioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d
Cir. 1960).
11 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960); Jacobs
v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1929); John Jacobs, 34 B.T.A. 594 (1936). See
also Rev. Rul. 247, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 272. The revenue ruling, which states that
subsequent events may be examined to ascertain the enforceability of a claim was
rejected in Russell v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1966) in which the court
held that the date of death was the proper time for determining the deductibility of a
claim.
86 62 T.C. 317 (1974).
88 The Courtney court specifically relied on the decision in Hagmann to support
an examination of subsequent events in determining the deductibility of a claim.
However, the two cases are distinguishable because the claim in Courtney was not
legally unenforceable under applicable state law.
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estate,9' was filed in 1970. Although the decedent's estate, the wife,
and the son were all liable for payment, the Tax Court disallowed a
deduction for the claim. The decision appears to be based on the fact
that the wife had continued to make regular payments and it was
thus unlikely that the bank would seek to enforce the claim against
the estate.
The taxpayer argued that since the claim was allowable under
Texas law, the still-existing right of the bank to enforce payment
against the estate constituted a deductible claim.2 The Government
conceded that the claim was still allowable under local law, but con-
tended that the creditor's failure to enforce the claim precluded a
deduction. The Tax Court determined that deductibility was not
dependent upon a local court decree. Instead, the court held that the
bank's failure to assert the claim and the lack of evidence that the
potential claim would ever be asserted, precluded a deduction despite
the fact that the claim was a personal obligation of the decedent,
enforceable against the estate. Analyzing the statute, the Courtney
court held that the claim was a right which, if unenforced, did not
constitute a "claim" within the meaning of § 2053(a)(3).11
The court in Courtney relied on the same underlying purpose of §
2053(a)(3) as that noted in Hagmann. Since the estate tax was de-
signed to levy on the net value being transferred, only claims paid or
to be paid were deductible. However, unlike the claim in Hagmann
which was statutorily unenforceable,94 this claim was still a potential
legal liability of the estate. The Courtney court's willingness to treat
the claim as if it were unenforceable on the basis of collateral facts
seems unique. Rather than determining that the mortgage was a
legally unenforceable claim against the estate, the court relied on the
alternative liability of the wife and of the property in the hands of
1, Because the value of the residence had not been included in the gross estate,
the Courtney court also rejected the estate's contention that the mortgage should be
deducted under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2053(a)(4). That section permits a deduction
from the gross estate for unpaid mortgages where the value of the decedent's interest,
undiminished by the indebtedness, in included in the gross estate. The Courtney court
briefly noted that the section was obviously inapplicable.
," Those courts which have held that Ithaca Trust applies to claims and that the
date of death is final for ascertaining deductibility have relied on the statutory lan-
guage of § 2053(a)(3) "as are allowable." Thus, whether or not the claim is actually
paid, the potential enforceability permits a deduction. See, e.g., Russell v. United
States, 260 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Winer v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 941
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Estate of Donald Elbert Lester, Sr., 57 T.C. 503 (1972). But see cases
cited note 86 supra.
' See cases cited note 86 supra.
" See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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the son as evidence that the bank would probably not enforce the
claim against the estate. It seems that the Tax Court should have
analyzed the legal effect of the transfer to the son to determine
whether or not the claim should be disallowed. To this extent, there-
fore, Courtney seems to be an extension of Hagmann because the
court treated as unenforceable a claim for which the estate, arguably,
remained legally liable. 5 However, whether or not this extension of
Hagmann is justified, both cases indicate that events subsequent to
the date of death, with a possible time limitation imposed by the
filing of an estate tax return, will be examined to determine the
deductibility of a claim. 6
B. Charitable Transfers Under § 20551
Section 20552 of the Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction,
5 The taxpayer relied on Cathcart v. Schwaner, 15 Am. Fed. Tax R. 564 (S.D.
Ill. 1935), to support the contention that potential legal liability was sufficient to
permit a deduction. In Cathcart, decedent purchased a farm and continued to make
payments after he conveyed the land to his daughter. The daughter took the farm
under a warranty deed which protected her from any encumbrances. The Cathcart
court permitted a deduction reasoning that at the date of death, decedent was still
liable for payment; and that decedent intended to convey the land free of the mortgage.
Id. at 565, 567. The Courtney court rejected this case and held that the decedent in
the instant case did not intend to relieve the son of liability but had conveyed the land
subject to the mortgage. Therefore, the Courtney court seemed to decide that the claim
against the estate was essentially unenforceable because the decedent intended his son
to be liable for the mortgage.
Arguably, the legal liability of the estate is not a matter about which the intent
of the decedent should be conclusive. Instead, the Courtney court should have exam-
ined the form of the transfer between the parents and the son. For example, if the
decedent transferred the land "subject to" the mortgage and valued the gift accord-
ingly (fair market value less amount of unpaid mortgage debt) then the estate became
a personal surety for the debt. Conversely, if the value of the gift was the full value of
the land, then the estate agreed to remain principally liable on the debt and would
have no recourse against the son or the land. See G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw
OF MORTGAGES §§ 288-89 (2d ed. 1970).
" See Comment, supra note 77, at 783 n.104. The author suggests that a final date
must be applied to permit a determination of the ultimate settlement of the estate. If
the date of death is rejected, the author suggests that the deductibility of claims should
be determined by the time the estate tax return is filed.
Several changes in the regulations relating to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055 were
promulgated in 1974. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2 as amended T.D. 7318, 1974 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 34, at 10. The purpose of the amended regulation is to clarify the provision
disallowing a deduction if the trust recipient participates in political campaigns (see
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in determining the taxable estate, for'all gifts to charity. The deduc-
tion is for the full amount of the charitable bequest included in the
gross estate.3 However, if the charitable bequest is reduced by estate
taxes, only the reduced amount may be deducted.4 Finally, if there
is an intervening life estate, the value of the charitable bequest must
be ascertainable at the date of testator's death before a deduction is
allowed. 5
§ 2055(a)(2)), and the provision disallowing a deduction in some instances in which
the transfer is for both charitable and non-charitable purposes (see § 2055(e)).
In addition, several revenue rulings in 1974 have clarified § 664 of INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954 which describes the requirements for the distribution of income from a charita-
ble remainder annuity trust and a charitable remainder unitrust. Rev. Rul. 19, 1974-1
CUM. BULL. 156 ruled that if the unitrust amount payable annually was not a fixed
percentage of the net fair market value of the assets, the trust failed to qualify. The
governing instrument of the trust provided that six per cent of the net fair market value
was to be paid annually. A portion of the trustee's fee was to be deducted from this
amount although the sum payable to the income beneficiaries was not to drop below
five per cent. Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(a)(2) (1956) requires that a charitable annuity trust
or a charitable remainder unitrust must qualify in every respect. Treas. Reg. § 1.664-
3 (1956) requires that the unitrust amount be computed as a fixed percentage. Since
the governing instrument of the unitrust did not specify a fixed percentage as the
unitrust amount, the trust failed to qualify.
In Rev. Rul. 39, 1974-1 CUM. BULL. 156, it was ruled that a gift through a charitable
remainder unitrust is deductible as a charitable contribution. In 1971, A made a gift,
through the trust, to a university which was the ultimate trust recipient. The trust
instrument provided that six per cent of the net fair market value of the trust be paid
to B for twenty years. If B did not survive, payment was to C for the balance of the
term, or if necessary, to C's heirs at law. Since the trust was a valid charitable remain-
der unitrust, the gift was valid as a deductible contribution.
Rev. Rul. 74-386, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 32, at 11 ruled that the provisions
relating to income payments from a charitable remainder annuity trust in Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.664-2(a)(5) (1956) and 1.664-3(a)(5) (1956), also applied to a charitable remainder
unitrust. The governing instrument of a charitable remainder unitrust provided pay-
ments in quarterly installments toA for life, then to B for life. A died on June 15 having
received the last quarterly installment on March 15. Since the treasury regulations
permit payment to terminate with the immediately preceding installment, there was
no need to prorate payments from April 1 to the time when B's life interest comm-
enced. The revenue ruling determined that the same rule applied to a charitable
remainder unitrust.
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(a).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(d).
INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(c).
See Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929). In that case the
Supreme Court held that despite the actual death of testator's wife within six months
of his death, mortality tables had to be used in computing the charitable deduction
because the time for settling the estate was the moment of testator's death. Id. at,155.
See text accompanying note 20 infra. See also Ballantine v. Tomlinson, 293 F.2d 311
(5th Cir. 1961); Norris v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1943).
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In Estate of McCoy, Jr. v. United States,' the court for the West-
ern District of Tennessee held that decedent had created a valid
charitable trust, and that a charitable deduction was allowable. The
decedent's will created a trust for the benefit of cultural arts in the
Memphis area. In addition, the will created three life estates giving
monthly stipends to the beneficiaries. Upon termination of the life
estates, the amounts payable were to be included in the charitable
trust. The issue in McCoy involved the trustee's power to invade trust
corpus for the benefit of one life tenant, and the trustee's discretion
to terminate the trust. The court held that because the standards for
invasion and termination were ascertainable, the charitable deduc-
tion was proper.
The McCoy court began its analysis by noting that although the
Tennessee county court found the trust to be charitable under state
law, a federal court was not bound by this decree. However, the court
concluded that the charitable trust was valid under § 2055(a)(2) .
The court next examined the standard controlling the trustee's inva-
sion of trust principal.8 The will authorized invasion for or on behalf
of one of the life tenants in the event of extreme need. The court
reasoned that since need had been held to be an ascertainable stan-
dard,9 extreme need was also a permissible objective criterion by
which to measure the trustee's power of invasion. Unlike a more
ambiguous provision allowing an amount necessary for enjoyment,"0
extreme need permitted valuation of the life interest measured at the
date of testator's death. Consequently, the trustee's power of invasion
did not defeat the charitable status of the trust.
The court in McCoy next analyzed the trustee's power to termi-
nate the trust and to distribute the trust assets. The will authorized
the trustee to terminate the trust, or any share, after a finding that
the cost of administration was unwarranted or that the continuation
was otherwise impractical. The court determined that this provision
6 374 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Tenn. 1974), a/i'd, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. $ 13,057 (6th
Cir. March 4, 1975).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(a)(2) provides that to qualify for the charitable
deduction, the recipient must be organized for charitable, religious, or educational
purposes.
See Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929). In that case the
Supreme Court held that where the trustee could invade principal to maintain the
surviving spouse at a date of death level of maintenance, the value of the life estate
was ascertainable. Therefore, the gift to charity was not so uncertain as to defeat the
charitable deduction. Id. at 154.
1 See Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. McGowan, 217 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1954).
"0 See Loyd v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 237 (W. D. Tenn. 1970), aff'd mem.,
443 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1971).
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forced the trustee to make an objective decision rather than permit-
ting him freely to terminate the trust. The will provision governing
distribution after termination stipulated that the recipients were to
be non-profit cultural organizations. However, the trustee could de-
termine which organizations actually benefited. Nevertheless, the
McCoy court held that the standards for trust termination and for
distribution were ascertainable." Thus, the trust qualified as charita-
ble and the estate was entitled to a charitable deduction.
Arguably, the standards for termination and for distribution were
not as objective as the standard for invasion of trust principal. The
McCoy court held that the objective finding of impracticability ne-
cessitated by the will before the trust or any share could be termi-
nated, was a sufficient standard to permit a charitable deduction. In
addition, the standard for distribution of the trust assets, to any non-
profit cultural organization in the Memphis area, was held to be an
objective standard. Yet, the court failed to cite any authority to sup-
port this holding. Seemingly the court in McCoy reasoned that once
the life interest was valued and it was certain that a remainder would
go to charity, the trustee might have broader discretion in terminat-
ing and distributing the trust than was required for invasion of trust
principal.
Two 1974 cases dealt with the liability of charitable bequests for
federal estate tax charges. In First National Bank v. United States,'
the Eighth Circuit held that specific charitable devises were not re-
quired to abate pro rata in order to satisfy federal estate tax liabili-
ties. By will, the decedent made general and specific bequests some
of which were to charity. The Commissioner, determining that the
residue was insufficient to pay federal estate taxes, charged these
taxes pro rata among the specific beneficiaries. This computation
reduced the charitable bequests and consequently reduced the chari-
table deduction.
The court in First National Bank began its analysis by noting that
state law governed the question of apportionment of taxes. 3 Under
Nebraska law, each beneficiary was charged with the taxes on the pro
rata value of his share unless a different method was clearly man-
dated by the will. Although the testator expressly directed protection
" The McCoy court noted that the result of this holding was to effectuate a
congressional preference for charitable gifts over estate taxes. See First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 490 F.2d 1054, 1057 (8th Cir. 1974); Norris v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d
796, 801 (7th Cir. 1943).
12 490 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1974).
" See Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
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of the specific devises, the court held that even if the testator had so
intended, post-mortem income could not be used to pay taxes in order
to relieve specific devises of tax liability." Instead, the court held that
where the fund responsible for taxes under the will is insufficient, the
testator's direction fails."
Since the will provision could not be followed, the court in First
National Bank next examined Nebraska law on the question of abate-
ment of charitable legacies. However, no Nebraska decisions dealt
with the problem. Thus, to resolve the issue, the court invoked gen-
eral principles of equity and congressional policy. The court reasoned
that it was inequitable to charge charitable bequests with a pro rata
share of federal estate taxes because the gifts to charity benefit other
estate recipients by lowering the taxable amount. Since charitable
bequests do not generate estate taxes they should not be liable for
payment. In addition, a strong congressional policy of encouraging
charitable gifts suggested that relief should be given from federal
estate taxes. In holding the charitable bequests to be free of payment
for the tax share, the court in First National Bank drew a distinction
between specific and residuary charitable legacies. The court con-
cluded that residuary charitable gifts could not be relieved of estate
tax because the residue did not exist until after payment of all debts
and obligations of the estate. 7 Thus, the court's holding seems to
apply only to specific gifts to charity.
In Buchanan v. United States,'" the court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania held that a residuary charitable bequest could not
be protected from abatement by payment of federal estate taxes from
" The testatrix directed that the devises and legacies be protected by using the
"body" of the estate to pay taxes. In analyzing the will, the court determined that even
if the term "body" was intended to mean post-mortem income, such income could not
be used to pay estate tax. 490 F.2d at 1056. There was no suggestion in the opinion
that the executors had actually attempted to use post-mortem income to pay the
federal estate taxes. The courts have consistently held that post-mortem income may
not be used. See Alston v. United States, 349 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1965); Ballantine v.
Tomlinson, 293 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1961); Buchanan v. United States, 377 F. Supp. 1011
(W.D. Pa. 1974); Waldrop v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 753 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
'5 490 F.2d at 1056.
" Id. at 1057. The same argument, that such bequests do not generate federal
estate tax, may be made in marital deduction cases. However, in marital deduction
cases, the courts have refused to presume that the testator intended to relieve the
marital share of federal taxes. See Part VIC Note 17 and accompanying text infra.
Conversely, the courts have been willing to protect specific charitable bequests through
use of a congressional preference for charitable gifts over federal estate taxes.
"1 490 F.2d at 1057 n.6. See Alston v. United States, 349 F.2d 87, 89 (5th Cir. 1965);
Ballantine v. Tomlinson, 293 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1961).
"1 377 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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post-mortem income. The will in question bequeathed the estate resi-
due to charity, and directed payment of death taxes from the princi-
pal of the residue. In computing the residue the estate executors
added post-mortem income earned over a fifteen month period, the
time given the estate in which to pay federal taxes, to the principal
amount. 9 The result of this computation was to increase the charita-
ble deduction available by increasing the principal of the residue.
The court disallowed the executor's method and held that the princi-
pal of the residue at its date of death value had to be charged with
the full amount of the taxes regardless of its charitable destination.2 0
The executor's first argument in support of his computation was
predicated on the fact that taxes were not due until fifteen months
after the date of death. Therefore, the executor contended that the
amount of taxes should be reduced to its present value at the date of
death.2 1' The Buchanan court rejected this argument for several rea-
sons. Although a reduction to present value had been permitted in
marital deduction cases where the estate made a lump sum alimony,
payment to decedent's divorced spouse, the court determined that
the two situations were distinguishable. Under the doctrine of Ithaca
Trust,- the obligation to pay estate taxes arose at the moment of
death. The fifteen month period in which to pay these taxes was
simply a matter of legislative grace, and the executor had the discre-
tion to pay any time within the period. Conversely, a surviving
spouse's right to support payments was based on the divorce decree.
Thus regular periodic payments were required, and the obligation to
pay on time was enforceable. In addition, the Buchanan court noted
that the word "amount" in § 2055(c)2' required payment of the taxes
at the date of death value.
The executor's second argument was that in calculating the chari-
table deduction, the potential of the tax fund to earn income at three
and one-half per cent over a fifteen month period should be included.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6075. In 1970, the statute was changed to allow only
nine months in which to pay estate and gift taxes.
21 377 F. Supp. at 1015.
"1 The executors relied on Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946),
and Commissioner v. State St. Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942). In both cases,
the wife was receiving alimony payments pursuant to a divorce decree. After the
husband's death, the wife settled her claim against the estate by accepting the present
value of the right to receive alimony. The courts permitted the estate to deduct the
amount actually paid to the wife.
22 Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929). See cases cited note 5
supra.
n INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055(c).
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The result of this argument would be to increase the principal of the
residue by the income subsequently earned, and then to deduct estate
taxes. The Buchanan court rejected this argument on the basis that
post-mortem income cannot be used to pay estate taxes in an effort
to preserve the charitable deduction. 4 Since the estate would receive
a deduction because the income was destined for charity, an imper-
missible double deduction would result. Finally, the court deter-
mined that such computation contravened the direction in the will
to pay estate taxes from the principal of the residue. Thus, despite
the effect on the charitable deduction, the court held that the princi-
pal of the residue had to bear the expense of estate taxes, with all
valuations being made as of the date of death.
It seems that the following principles were developed or reiterated
in 1974 with respect to charitable bequests. A charitable deduction
may be taken for a remainder interest only if the standard for inva-
sion of principal for the life tenant's benefit is objective enough to
permit valuation of the life interest at the date of the settlor's death.
However, a trustee may be given broader discretion to terminate the
trust and to distribute assets if the recipients upon termination are
nonprofit organizations. In addition, although an effort will be made
to abate residuary devises before specific devises, post-mortem in-
come may never be used to protect a charitable bequest.
C. Marital Deduction Under § 2056.
Section 2056(a)' of the Internal Revenue Code permits a marital
deduction, in determining the taxable estate, not to exceed one-half
of the decedent's adjusted gross estate.' The purpose of this deduc-
tion is to equalize the estate tax treatment of marital property be-
tween community property and common law property states.2
24 See cases cited note 14 supra.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963), in which the Court stated:
To equalize the incidence of progressively scaled estate taxes and to
adhere to the patterns of state law, the marital deduction permits a
deceased spouse, subject to certain requirements, to transfer free of
taxes one-half of the non-community property to the surviving spouse
. . . . The purpose, however, is only to permit a married couple's
property to be taxed in two stages and not to allow a tax-exempt
transfer of wealth into succeeding generations.
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However, the circumstances in which the deduction may be taken are
strictly circumscribed to insure that the interest passing from the
decedent will be taxed in the surviving spouse's estate.' For example,
the deduction is prohibited if the surviving spouse receives a life
estate with a power of appointment which is not freely exercisable.5
Also, the deduction is disallowed if the surviving spouse receives an
interest which is contingent at the date of death.' Both of these inter-
ests violate the "terminable interest" rule which prevents the deduc-
tion if the interest passing from the decedent will not be taxed in the
surviving spouse's estate.
7
In Winkle v. United States,' the court for the Southern District
of Ohio dealt with the limitation imposed on the marital deduction
by § 2056(b)(5).9 This sub-section permits a deduction if the surviv-
ing spouse receives a life estate in property passing from the dece-
dent. However, the deduction is permitted only if the spouse has a
right to all the income from the life estate and a general power to
appoint the interest which is exercisable alone and in all events.,'
Otherwise, the life estate violates the terminable interest rule and no
deduction is permitted. The court in Winkle determined that under
Ohio law" the surviving spouse had properly received a life estate in
Id. at 128. Accord, Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964); Allen v. United
States, 359 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1966); Dodd v. United States, 345 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1965);
Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955).
See cases cited note 3 supra.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5). See text accompanying note 8 infra.
6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(1). See text accompanying note 15 infra.
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-i (1958).
381 F. Supp. 536 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5).
'o One court has noted that the deduction for this interest was essential since a
life estate with a power of appointment was a usual common law disposition. Starrett
v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163, 165 (1st Cir. 1955).
" The courts have long held that state law determines the proper characterization
of the interest passing from the decedent. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S.
456 (1967); Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942); United States v. Mappes, 318 F.2d
508 (10th Cir. 1963); Thompson v. Wiseman, 233 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1956).
In Estate of C. Warren Caswell, 62 T.C. 51 (1974), the Tax Court held that state
law also controls the form and procedure for filing the disclaimer of an interest under
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(d)(2). In Caswell a son and daughter each received a
one-third interest in their father's residence after he died intestate. In an effort to
disclaim these interests so that the entire residence would go to the mother, and would
consequently increase the marital deduction, the children filed a deed. The Tax Court
held that because the deed was not in the proper form of a renunciation of an interest
under New York law, it did not qualify as a valid disclaimer for purposes of the marital
deduction.
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an interest passing from the decedent. Nevertheless, the court disal-
lowed the marital deduction because the spouse did not have a power
of appointment which was exercisable alone and in all events.
Specifically, the husband and wife in Winkle had entered into a
contract to make a will in which the wife agreed to bequeath stock
to the husband's grandchildren. Subsequently, the husband executed
a will in which the stock he owned as a major shareholder in a family
corporation was bequeathed to the wife. The will stipulated that
should the wife choose to disassociate herself from the corporation,
it had the right of first refusal to purchase the stock. In addition, the
will directed that the wife must, at her death, leave the stock as
specified in the contract.
In holding that the interest in the shares did not qualify for the
marital deduction, the Winkle court rejected two arguments ad-
vanced by the petitioner. The estate first argued that the wife had
actually received a fee simple absolute, asserting that the will had not
properly incorporated the contract, and that a bequest in fee simple
absolute could not be varied by other terms in the will under Ohio
law. The court in Winkle examined Ohio law, which controlled in
determining the interest passing to the wife, and concluded that the
will had properly incorporated the contract. Thus, the two instru-
ments had to be read together to ascertain the husband's intent. The
court also concluded that, under Ohio law, subsequent terms in the
will could vary a fee simple absolute. Therefore, the court held that
the wife had received a life estate in the shares of the family corpora-
tion.
Having ascertained the interest which the wife received under the
will, the Winkle court examined the power of appointment to deter-
mine if it was exercisable alone and in all events. The estate argued
that since the wife could sell the stock and freely dispense with the
proceeds, the requirements of § 2056(b)(5) were met. The court held
that this did not satisfy the "all events" requirement but was simply
one event in which the wife could freely exercise the power. 2 Under
the will, the wife could not freely dispense with the shares without
first offering them to the corporation.' 3 Thus, the corporation's right
12 The court in Winkle applied the definition of a power of appointment exercis-
able alone and in all events provided in Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (1958).
,s In Winkle, the wife also lost the power of appointment, by the terms of the will,
if she became incapacitated or bankrupt. Accord, Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d
163 (1st Cir. 1955), in which the court held that loss of a power of appointment if the
surviving spouse was incapacitated or mentally incompetent made the interest passing
to the spouse terminable. Id. at 166-67.
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of first refusal defeated the wife's ability to exercise, without inhibi-
tion, the power of appointment. The court in Winkle concluded that
the requirements of § 2056(b)(5) had not been met, and that no
marital deduction could be taken for the interest in the shares passing
from the decedent.
A second limitation on the marital deduction is contained in §
2056(b)(1)'4 which states that if the interest passing to the surviving
spouse is contingent, no deduction is permitted. The contingency of
the interest violates the terminable interest rule because the amount
may not be later taxed in the surviving spouse's estate. In In re Estate
of Abely,' 5 the First Circuit held that a Massachusetts widow's allow-
ance was contingent under § 2056(b)(1) and disallowed a marital
deduction. In addition, the court concluded that the allowance ac-
tually received did not qualify as a widow's allowance under Massa-
chusetts law. In Abely, the decedent was survived by his wife and
three sons. One and one-half years after his death, the widow peti-
tioned for and received a statutory allowance which was made retro-
active to the date of death. No appeal was taken from the probate
court decree. The First Circuit determined that since a widow must
survive to the date of the probate court decree to take the allowance,
the interest was contingent and did not qualify for the marital deduc-
tion.'"
In reaching this conclusion, the Abely court held that the contin-
gency of an interest was to be determined at the date of death.'7 The
court also held that under the facts of Abely, the interest did not
qualify as a widow's allowance, thus refusing to consider the probate
court decree as definitive of the interest passing from the decedent.
Under the probate court decree, the widow received $50,000. Thus,
the Abely court distinguished this case from the usual one in which
a widow's allowance is small and is requested immediately after
death. Finally, the failure to appeal evidenced a private arrangement
between the beneficiaries designed to avoid the federal estate tax.'
8
'4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(1).
" 489 F.2d 1327 (1st Cir. 1974).
16 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Jackson v. United States,
376 U.S. 503 (1964); Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955).
,1 See United States v. Mappes, 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963). The courts' insist-
ence on viewing the contingency and the valuation of an interest passing to the surviv-
ing spouse at the date of death is in sharp contrast to decisions under INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954 § 2053, where the courts have held that subsequent events may be examined
to ascertain the estate's actual liability for claims. See Part VIB Note 16 and accompa-
nying text supra.
"S See Estate of Peyton v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963); First-
Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1940).
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Therefore, the probate court decree granting the interest as a widow's
allowance was not controlling for federal estate tax purposes, and the
widow's right to the allowance, analyzed at the date of death, was
deemed contingent.
The two bases for the decision in Abely are consistent with earlier
case law. In Jackson v. United States,9 the Supreme Court, discuss-
ing the California widow's allowance, held that the contingency, and
therefore the terminability, of an interest was to be ascertained at the
date of death. The Court noted that if an interest vests only after a
probate court decree, the possibility that the spouse will not survive
to the date of the decree renders the interest contingent. The fact that
the widow actually did survive to receive the interest, and the conse-
quent assurance that the interest would be taxed in the surviving
spouse's estate, was irrelevant. The Court refused to add judicial
exceptions to the limitations imposed by Congress on the marital
deduction, and decided that the ultimate availability of the marital
deduction depends on the proper drafting of wills.
The second ground for the decision in Abely, that a probate court
decree was not controlling on the kind of interest passing from the
decedent to the surviving spouse, was originally established in
Commissioner v. Bosch. 0 In dealing with the liability of the marital
interest for federal taxes, the Supreme Court held that a lower state
court decision was not controlling in determining the application of
a federal taxing statute. If there was no decision by the highest court
of the state, a federal court should analyze state law to define the
interest passing to a surviving spouse. Lower state court decisions
were merely relevant evidence in this analysis. The Bosch decision
was based partly on the non-adversity of the probate court proceed-
ing, and partly on the congressional intent to circumscribe narrowly
the marital deduction.
In 1974, several courts also considered whether the interest pass-
ing to the surviving spouse should be liable for any of the estate tax.2 1
Section 2056(b)(4)(A) 2  provides that in valuing the interest on which
the deduction will be based, state and federal taxes and estate debts
must be taken into account. Only the net value of the interest passing
376 U.S. 503 (1964).
20 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
21 Developments in 1974 considering the liability of the marital share for federal
estate taxes include Estate of Wycoff v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1974);
Thayn v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1974); Estate of John A. Dawson,
62 T.C. 315 (1974).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(4)(A).
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to the surviving spouse may be deducted. The result of this rule is a
reduction in the value of the interest qualifying for a marital deduc-
tion, and a concomitant increase in the over-all tax liability of the
estate or the beneficiaries2 should the spouse's legacy be held ac-
countable for any of the tax bill. Nevertheless, the courts have re-
fused to presume that the testator intended to achieve the maximum
allowable marital deduction and, if the will is not clearly written,
have forced the surviving spouse's interest to pay its portion of the
estate taxes and other claims.
2 4
In Estate of John A. Dawson,25 the Tax Court held that the resi-
duary share of the estate was liable for claims to the full extent of its
value. The decedent's will contained a provision ordering the pay-
ment of all debts, but neglected to specify which portion of the estate
would be liable. After devising two parcels of realty, the will be-
queathed the residue of the estate to the surviving wife. The estate
claimed a marital deduction to the full extent of the residue. How-
ever, the Commissoner, affirmed by the Tax Court, completely disal-
lowed the deduction because the estate debts including the tax liabil-
ity were in excess of the value of the residue. Since no interest had
passed to the wife, the marital deduction was unavailable.
The Dawson court began its analysis by noting that state law
determines which portion of the estate bears the burden for claims
and taxes.26 Under Illinois law, the residue of the estate is primarily
liable for these charges. The court in Dawson thus rejected peti-
tioner's argument that even if the residue was liable, it should be
charged only the proportionate amount of the estate debts.
In Thayn v. United States, 2 the District Court for Utah dealt with
See, e.g., Thayn v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1974), in which
the court stated that, "as a general rule a testator would prefer to reduce the share of
the children by requiring them to pay the entire but smaller estate tax rather than to
reduce the wife's share and increase the total estate tax. . . ." Id. at 250 n.4. Accord,
Dodd v. United States, 345 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1965); Robinson v. United States, 369 F.
Supp. 925 (D. Mont. 1974).
24 Estate of Wycoff v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1974); Thayn v.
United States, 386 F. Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1974); Estate of John A. Dawson, 62 T.C.
315 (1974).
- 62 T.C. 315 (1974).
"' See, e.g., Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309
U.S. 78 (1940); Thompson v. Wiseman, 233 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1956). The requirement
of distributing the burden of taxes and expenses as mandated by state law does not
mean, however, that federal courts are bound by a lower state court proceeding. See
Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Estate of Howard E. Stevens, 36 T.C.
184 (1961).
1 386 F. Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1974).
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the liability of the residuary estate, bequeathed to the surviving wife,
for federal and state taxes. The second will provision directed the
executrix to pay all just debts, including taxes, as soon as possible.
The sixth will clause directed payment of one-half of the residue of
the estate to the spouse. The Commissioner charged this residue with
its proportionate share of the estate taxes although a Utah state trial
court had decreed that the residuary estate passing to the children
was to bear the full tax burden. The Thayn court determined that the
state court decree was merely evidence and undertook an indepen-
dent analysis of Utah state law.28
After a discussion and application of Utah law, the Thayn court
concluded that the testator did not intend to protect the marital
share from its proportionate estate tax liability. As in Estate of John
A. Dawson,29 the court in Thayn held that unless presented with a
decision by the highest court of a state, estate tax liability may be
independently ascertained. The Thayn court did recognize that the
marital deduction is advantageous because it reduces the over-all tax
liability of the estate thereby increasing each beneficiary's share.
Further, the court noted the strong congressional purpose in creating
the marital deduction in order to permit a uniform tax treatment for
the surviving spouse between common law and community property
states. However, relying on the Supreme Court holding in Jackson v.
United States," the court determined that the availability of the
marital deduction depended on the proper drafting of the will. Thus
Dawson and Thayn are consistent in holding that state law controls
the burden of estate tax liability and that a testator is not presumed
to intend a maximum marital deduction for the estate.3 ' If state law
directs payment of estate debts or taxes from the residue, or if under
state rules of construction the testator's intent cannot be ascertained
as requiring a maximum marital deduction, § 2056(b)(4) (A) permits
a deduction only for the net value of the interest passing to the surviv-
ing spouse.3
2
2 See Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Estate of Howard E. Stevens,
36 T.C. 184 (1961).
- 62 T.C. 315 (1974).
376 U.S. 503 (1964).
3, See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra.
32 The court in Thayn suggested that the following clause, if used, would have
relieved the marital share of any tax or debt liability: "'No part of any interest passing
to my wife to be limited, reduced, or'lessened by any taxes or debts of this estate.'"
Thayn v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 245, at 249 n.3, quoting Robinson v. United
States, 369 F. Supp. 925, 927 (D. Mont. 1974).
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In Estate of Wycoff v. Commissioner,33 the Tenth Circuit held
that the marital trust created by decedent's will was liable for federal
and state inheritance tax. Despite a strong dissent, the majority held
that the provisions in the testator's will did not evidence an intent
to relieve the marital interest of estate tax liability. The decedent
created a marital trust of fifty percent of the adjusted gross estate,
and directed the executor first to include liquid assets to comprise
this amount. The will also contained a just debts clause which pro-
vided in part: "I further direct that all inheritance, estate and trans-
fer taxes due by reason of my death shall be paid out of that portion
of my estate which is not included in the Marital Trust . . . 31
However, the clause also provided that the executor could use the
marital trust assets if it was felt to be necessary in an exercise of
sound business judgment. The majority held that the authority of the
executor to use marital trust assets defeated any claimed intent to
take a full marital deduction. Consequently, the marital trust was
reduced by the death taxes, and a deduction could be taken only for
the net value of the interest under § 2056(b)(4)(A). The majority also
held that the executor's actual use of the marital trust assets was
immaterial.
In analyzing the effect of death taxes on the marital trust, the
Wycoff court established three relevant rules of construction. First,
the marital deduction must be strictly construed.35 This rule places
the burden on the taxpayer to prove that the interest passing to the
surviving spouse qualifies for the deduction, and to what extent the
interest may be deducted. Second, the interest passing to the surviv-
ing spouse is to be ascertained at the date of death .3 Third, federal
law governs the value of the marital deduction and the effect of death
taxes upon that deduction.3 7 However, the Wycoff court noted, as had
the court in Thayn, that apportionment of tax liability was governed
by state law.
Applying these rules of construction, the Wycoff court held that
the marital trust must be reduced by the death taxes. Viewed as of
the date of death, the executor's authority to invade the marital trust
belied the estate's contention that the testator clearly intended to
506 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1974).
3, Id. at 1147.
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964); Allen v. United States,
359 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1966); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 345
F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1965).
" See, e.g., Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309
U.S. 78 (1940); Thompson v. Wiseman, 233 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1956).
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take a maximum marital deduction. The court determined that the
date of death rule must be followed because it contributed definite-
ness and precision to an analysis of the will provision. In addition,
the court contrasted the will clause with other clauses in similar
cases, and decided that the testator's wording was too ambiguous to
support a maximum marital deduction."8 Since the executor, at the
date of death, could have paid estate taxes from the marital trust,
and because the testator's intent was indefinite, only the net value
of the interest passing to the surviving spouse was deductible. 9
The Wycoff dissent" disagreed with the majority's analysis of the
testator's intent, although no explicit criticism was made of the three
rules of construction employed. The dissent analyzed the will provi-
sion and concluded that the testator's intent was clear. Estate taxes
were to be paid out of non-marital assets. In part, this conclusion was
based on the sound business judgment standard imposed on the exec-
utor by the will. The dissent reasoned that this standard created
liability for the executor unless demonstrably sound judgment man-
dated an invasion of the trust assets. Further, the dissent noted that
the directives in the will were phrased mandatorily, evidencing the
testator's intent to shift tax liability from the marital trust.
- The majority in Wycoff suggested that a proper will provision to avoid any
liability of marital assets was that used in Estate of Rudolph G. Leeds, 54 T.C. 781
(1970). In Leeds, the testator provided:
My said Executor shall also pay from my estate all federal estate tax
from whomsoever due and however assessed, and all estate, succes-
sion, legacy, and inheritance tax, but in so doing said taxes shall be
paid from other property than that given and devised to my wife or
from life insurance received by her, so that any property received by
her as the result of my death will not be reduced by the payment of
said taxes, and for the further reason that my estate may get the full
benefit of the marital deduction as defined in the Federal Tax Reduc-
tion Act of 1948.
Id. at 782.
11 A similar problem of will construction arose in Revenue Ruling 42, 1974-1 Cum.
BULL. 281. In that fact situation, the testator had used a formula bequest to leave the
precise maximum marital amount to the surviving spouse. The issue presented was
whether life insurance proceeds passing to the spouse outside the will reduced the
amount of the marital deduction. The ruling stated that where technical words are
used in a will, and there is no expressed intention to give the words a different meaning,
the special meaning is applicable. In the will, the testator gave all interests "which
qualify for the marital deduction." Id. at 282. Since life insurance proceeds are nonded-
uctible interests which are not included in the gross estate, the will provision was held
not to refer to them. Therefore, the maximum allowable marital deduction was permit-
ted.
40 506 F.2d 1144, at 1152 (Moore, J., dissenting).
